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Abstract 
The prime lending rate is the rate at which commercial banks loan funds to their most 
creditworthy customers, and hence, is usually lower than other market lending rates; reason why 
it is considered a “base or reference rate”. In Sri Lanka, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) has 
been compiling the Average Weighted Prime Lending Rate (AWPR) since January 1986. This 
paper examines the determinants of prime lending rates in Sri Lanka using weekly data from 
January 2004 to June 2013, while attempting to capture any asymmetries in prime rate changes to 
monetary policy decisions. Empirical evidence suggests that the prime rate is highly persistent, 
while the call money rate also remains a key determinant. However, domestic liquidity was 
statistically insignificant and even if it was, it has only a marginal impact in determining the 
prime lending rate. Furthermore, there is also evidence of asymmetric adjustment in AWPR. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. The Prime Lending Rate and its Importance? 
Financial intermediation, which involves transfer of funds from surplus units (i.e., savers or lenders) to deficit 
units (i.e., borrowers) of an economy, is traditionally, the primary activity of banking institutions worldwide. 
Banks, or financial intermediaries for that matter, mobilise deposits and lend the same to customers who require, 
but short of funds. The loaning of funds will be at different rates of interest determined by those individual banks, 
which depends on various factors such as the type, size and creditworthiness of the customer, term and purpose of 
the loan, inter alia. 
The prime lending rate (herein referred to as the prime rate), as the name implies, is the rate of interest charged 
by banks from their most creditworthy and/or high net worth clients for short-term loans. Since the likelihood of 
prime customers defaulting on loans are minimal, the rate of interest charged by banks on prime lending would be 
relatively lower compared to that charged from non-prime customers. Due to this reason, the prime rate is usually 
considered to be a “base or reference rate” that banks use to price other types of loan products offered by them for 
both personal and commercial purposes. Further, according to Dueker and Thornton (1994) business corporates 
use the prime rate as a benchmark to evaluate their own creditworthiness. 
 
1.2. The Prime Lending Rate in Sri Lanka: AWPR 
1.2.1. Historical Background 
The Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) has been publishing the Average Weighted Prime Lending Rate 
(AWPR) since 1986, based on the information collected by commercial banks on prime lending. This has been used 
as an indicator of the average lending rate charged by commercial banks from their most creditworthy customers, 
predominantly on short-term loans. 
Since the commencement of compiling and publishing of AWPR, it has served as a guiding indicator to the 
financial institutions as a benchmark lending rate as it offered a clear reflection of short-term money market 
interest rates. More importantly, AWPR was used as a leading indicator interest rate by the CBSL to monitor the 
impact of monetary policy measures and the monetary policy transmission mechanism. 
 
1.2.2. Current Practice and Compilation Methodology  
The banking system in Sri Lanka consists of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL), which is the monetary 
authority and 33 other banks (by end June 2013), of which 24 are licensed commercial banks (LCBs) while the rest 
are licensed specialised banks (LSBs). Both LCBs and LSBs cater to the public, which includes customers from 
individuals to large corporates. Both these institutions have their prime as well as ordinary customers when it 
comes to lending and every individual bank determines the rate to be charged on loans from their prime customers, 
which is the prime rate of that particular bank. 
Based on the information provided by all commercial banks on new lending (which are usually on a short-term 
basis) to their prime customers during the week, the CBSL compiles the AWPR on a weekly basis, which is 
subsequently communicated to the public via their official website, along with bankwise AWPR.  
The formula to calculate the AWPR is as follows: 
 W    
∑ (m   r)ni  
∑ (m)ni  
              (1) 
where, 
m    mount of new loans 
r     Interest rate 
n     o. of new loans 
 
The guidelines1 on reporting transactions for the compilation of AWPR are as follows: 
i. Interest rates applicable to the ten lowest cost borrowers in respect of overdrafts and other short-term 
advances, which have an original maturity of three months or less and which have been re-priced or disbursed 
during the week, along with the relevant outstanding amounts are to be reported.  
ii. Only interest rates pertaining to domestic rupee operations with the private sector customers are to be 
reported.  
iii. Credit to government corporations and departments are to be excluded. 
iv.  dvances granted to prime customers, i.e., most creditworthy customers who are in the top tier of each bank‟s 
risk grading grid are to be reported and not the advances granted to prime sectors such as exports, 
agriculture, etc. 
v. Subsidised lending including refinance loans are to be excluded. 
vi. Advances that are fully secured by cash deposits or government securities are excluded. 
vii. Call money-market transactions are excluded. 
viii. Interest rates on unadvised credit lines and penal interest rates are excluded. 
ix. Only transactions above Rs. 10 million are to be reported. 
 
The significance of AWPR in Sri Lanka has increased in the recent years as it has been increasingly used by 
almost all commercial banks as a base rate in place of other short-term market interest rates such as the 91-day 
Treasury bill rate or the Sri Lanka Interbank Offered Rate (SLIBOR) when pricing their loans. Thus, the prime 
rate is considered to be one of the most important interest rates in Sri Lanka, especially for large corporates, as 
changes in the prime could affect their cost of funds and ultimately the profitability of their business ventures. 
 
                                                             
1The guidelines are issued by the Economic Research Department of CBSL. 
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Figure-1. Weekly AWPR vs. Weekly Average Liquidity 
                                Source: CBSL 
 
 
Figure-2. Weekly AWPR vs. Weekly Average of AWCMR 
                       Source: CBSL 
 
 
Figure-3. AWPR-AWCMR Spread vs. Weekly Average Liquidity 
                                Source:  uthor‟s calculations, CBSL 
 
This paper aims to analyse the behaviour of the prime lending rate in Sri Lanka. To start with, this study is 
attempts to identify the key determinants of the prime lending rate and their statistical significance. Moreover, 
corporates claim that prime lending rates of commercial banks respond slow to changes in monetary policy, 
especially during policy relaxation periods and insist that the prime lending rate of the current week, charged by 
commercial banks, is set based on the preceding week‟s  W   published by CBSL. In order to verify the above , 
econometric tests are conducted to test for asymmetric adjustments during different monetary policy cycles in the 
economy. Further, the above experiments are extended to examine the existence of prime rate persistence, followed 
by an analysis of its implications on policy. 
In doing so, this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses literature on determinants of interest rates, 
particularly the prime lending rate, and asymmetries in prime rate changes and persistence. Section 3 details data 
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and statistical/econometric tools used in this exercise, followed by Section 4, which presents the model, findings 
and analysis. The final section, Section 5, will present the conclusions of the study and policy implications. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Many researchers have observed that banks respond quickly to changes in the stance of monetary policy by 
way of increasing their loan rates much faster during tightening cycles than reducing when monetary policy is 
eased (Diebold and Sharpe, 1990; Cover, 1992). However, this is barely true when deposit rates are concerned, as 
banks react faster by lowering deposit rates during relaxing cycles compared to policy tightening cycles, where the 
deposit rates are sluggishly raised (Neumark and Sharpe, 1992; Hutchison, 1995). 
The same irregularity has been noticed by many analysts when it comes to changes in the prime lending rate  
(Dueker and Thornton, 1994; Mester and Saunders, 1995). Such asymmetries slow the pass-through and neutralise 
the full effects of monetary policy. However, some analysts have found little or no evidence of such asymmetries 
(Goldberg, 1982; Laderman, 1990; Tkacz, 2001; Amarasekara, 2005).  
The downward stickiness of lending rates in general and the prime rate in particular as highlighted by most 
researchers is likely to be due to the following; 
 To maximise the bank‟s profitability by increasing the prime lending rates immediately or quickly after policy 
rates are raised. 
 Delaying the reduction in the prime rates when policy rates are lowered in order to compensate for or recover 
the increased cost of funds accrued by mobilising deposits at high rates of interest.  
 Banks would choose to delay lowering of rates or not lower rates at all if switching costs of customers are 
significantly high.  
 Banks, in order to avoid problems of adverse selection, moral hazard and the increased credit risk of companies 
during cyclical downturns in the economy, end up charging a higher prime or delay reducing the prime, albeit 
the downward adjustment of policy rates by the monetary authority in order to revive economic activity. 
 
It is also noteworthy that the significance of the prime rate has diminished in some countries as pointed out by 
Arak et al. (1983); Dueker and Thornton (1994) and Dueker (2000) due to the increased amount of loans that have 
been made below the prime rate. 
Arak et al. (1983) explaining the behaviour of the prime rate in the US during 1972 - 1983, highlighted that 
there was minimal or no asymmetry in the prime rate in relation to the market lending rates during the early 
1970s. However, the degree of asymmetry increased during the late 1970s and early 1980s on account of the 
development of substitutes to domestic bank lending such as the growth of the commercial paper market and 
increased access to sources of funds abroad, thereby providing banks the opportunity to charge varied rates from 
both interest-sensitive and non-interest-sensitive borrowers. 
Laderman (1990) using vector autoregression (VAR) to study the responsiveness of the prime rate to open 
market interest rates in the US, found out that that the prime rate‟s responsiveness to Treasury bill rates, which 
was rather poor during 1964 – 1982, improved and became more closely linked in the subsequent period (1983 – 
1990) due to increased competition from the commercial paper market and advancements in technology.   
Mester and Saunders (1995) found out that adjustments to the prime rate will occur only when the returns 
from the difference of the optimal prime rate and the current prime rate exceeds the costs of changing the prime. 
Further, they observed that banks raise their prime rate dramatically when cost of funds increase, but delay 
reducing prime rates as cost of funds reduce so as to make short-term profits. 
Dueker and Thornton (1994) using an ordered probit model to measure asymmetry in the prime rate, identified 
that banks respond strongly and speedily to increases but sluggishly to decreases in the Federal  eserve‟s discount 
rate with the rationale for such downward stickiness being to make an allowance for or charging a risk premia by 
reducing lending rates slowly during cyclical downturns. 
In line with the above, Dueker (2000) again in his paper on asymmetries in the prime rate, pointed out that 
contractionary monetary policy have greater effect than relaxed monetary policy in the US, but accentuated that if 
not for asymmetry, banks would lend fewer funds as asymmetry is perhaps the reaction of the market to odds of 
borrowers defaulting or making late payments during economic downturns. 
However, Tkacz (2001) using a simple threshold model considering weekly data from the early 1970s till the 
late 1990s concluded that prime rate changes respond symmetrically to changes in the Fed funds rate while the 
prime rate adjustment is more definite when the disparity among the prime and the Fed funds rate movements 
broaden and is more. 
Thompson (2006) applying threshold autoregressive (TAR) and momentum threshold autoregressive (MTAR) 
models found asymmetries in the US prime lending-deposit rate spread during the period of October 1979 to 
March 2003, which supports the theory that banks adjust their lending rates at snail's pace as the spread widens. 
Whilst agreeing with most other researchers on the asymmetric adjustment of the prime rate to changes in the 
Fed funds rate over the period from February 1987 to October 2005, Payne and Waters (2008) concluded that the 
prime rate was more upward rigid (i.e., the prime rate adjusted slower to a decrease in the Fed funds rate) as 
opposed to being downward rigid as claimed by Mester and Saunders (1995); Dueker and Thornton (1994); Dueker 
(2000) and Thompson (2006).  
Findings on the above in the Sri Lankan context would be appropriate to look into. However, there is very 
limited literature on the above area under discussion. Amarasekara (2005) examined the interest rate pass-through 
from policy interest rates to call money rates and from that to retail interest rates of commercial banks over the 
period of June 1990 – December 2004, and found out that there is a fuller pass-through from policy rates to the call 
money market rate, while a complete and faster pass-through from call money rates to the prime lending rate could 
also be observed, unlike to other retail bank interest rates, showing no indication of an asymmetry in the pass-
through. 
As stated above, prior empirical studies on the prime lending rate in Sri Lanka and asymmetries in adjustment 
of prime lending rates to changes in the monetary policy stance are very limited. Further, there was no published 
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literature found on the subject of persistence of the prime rate in Sri Lanka. Hence, this study, which attempts to 
discuss all of the abovementioned issues, is likely to set the platform along with few other research studies on the 
area of interest rates in Sri Lanka with a greater emphasis on the prime lending rate, its determinants, 
asymmetries, persistence and implications on policy. Data and statistical/ econometric tools that would be used for 
this exercise to fulfill the achievements of this study would be discussed in the next section. 
 
3. Data and Statistical/Econometric Tools Used 
3.1. Description of Data 
As specified before, the purpose of this study is to analyse the behaviour of prime lending rates in Sri Lanka, 
while emphasizing on its determinants, asymmetric behaviour in prime rate movements, persistence and its policy 
implications. Following extensive analysis of prime lending rates in Sri Lanka, it has been noted that changes to 
the prime rate are likely to be caused by changes in the short-term money market interest rates triggered by 
changes in the monetary policy stance, i.e., changes in the policy interest rates as decided by the Monetary Board of 
the Central Bank. It has also been identified that changes in the levels of domestic money market liquidity also 
contribute to changes in short-term money market rates, which could, in effect, affect the prime lending rate.  
Hence, for the purpose of this study, we use weekly AWPR, and weekly averages of the average weighted call 
money rate (AWCMR) and liquidity in the domestic money market from the period ranging from 01 January 2004 
to 27 June 2013, which includes 496 observations. Definitions of the AWCMR and domestic money market 
liquidity are given below. 
a) Average weighted call money rate (AWCMR) – This is the weighted average of the rates at which banks 
transact with other banks in the interbank call money market.  
b) Domestic money market liquidity – This refers to the excess or shortfall of funds in the domestic money 
market. This is measured as reserves held by commercial banks with the Central Bank in excess of the required 
reserve. 
Data on AWCMR and domestic money market liquidity are available on a daily basis. However, for the purpose of 
this study, weekly averages of both AWCMR and domestic money market liquidity are used as data on AWPR is 
available only on a weekly basis. These 3 variables are denoted as follows: 
i. WKAWPR – Weekly Average Weighted Prime Lending Rate (in per cent) 
ii. WKAVGAWCMR – Weekly Average of Average Weighted Call Money Rate (in per cent) 
iii. WKAVGLIQ – Weekly Average Liquidity in the Domestic Money Market (in billion Sri Lanka Rupees) 
To further aid our analysis, it was to be decided whether obtaining the first differences and/or the detrended 
series of the above variables would be vital to effectively support the range of econometric tests that was to be 
performed as part of this exercise. Normally, interest rates are stationary but in the case of Sri Lanka, due to 
episodes of high inflation, interest rates tend to be non-stationary. Detrending interest rates using the Hodrick-
Prescott Filter (HP Filter) allows the analysis to be done based on a gap approach where the trend component and 
the cyclical component are separated, facilitating a more effective analysis. Therefore, it was decided to detrend 
WKAWPR and WKAVGAWCMR using the HP Filter, whereby cyclical and trend series of the above variables 
were obtained using a smoothing parameter of Lambda (λ) 270,400, as those were weekly data. The cyclical or 
detrended series of WKAWPR and WKAVGAWCMR is denoted as HPCYCLEAWPR and HPCYCLEAWCMR, 
respectively. Also, a dummy variable was created to reflect the monetary policy stance adopted by the CBSL. 
DUMMYUP is the dummy variable defined as 1 to indicate periods of monetary policy tightening or increase in 
policy interest rates. 
 
3.2. Description of Statistical/ Econometric Tools Used  
In order to identify the determinants of prime lending rates, asymmetries in prime rate changes and 
persistence, the following statistical methods and econometric tests were used:  
a) Descriptive statistics, namely, mean, median, standard deviation, maximum and minimum of time series data to 
identify the properties of the dataset. 
b) Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, a unit root test, was used to test for stationarity of the data prior to 
using these for econometric analysis so as to avoid any spurious or nonsensical regressions. 
c) Correlation tests were carried out to identify any statistical relationships among the above variables  
d) Granger causality tests introduced by Clive Granger were used to test causality between AWPR, AWCMR 
and liquidity to identify whether changes in AWCMR and liquidity causes changes in AWPR or vice versa. 
e) Ordinary least square regressions were used to identify whether call money rates and domestic money market 
liquidity are key determinants of the prime lending rate in Sri Lanka. Further, it also aids in testing persistence, 
which is a key objective of this study. 
f) A vector autoregression (VAR) model was drawn to test how a one-time shock to the independent variables, 
i.e., the call money market rate, domestic money market liquidity, and the lagged prime lending rate, could bring 
about a change in AWPR in the current period.  
 
4. Analysis and Findings 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Prior to performing other complex econometric analyses, it will be useful to look into the descriptive statistics 
to better understand and explain the properties of the data variables that are used in this study. Table 1 exhibits 
the descriptive statistics, including mean, median, maximum, minimum and standard deviation of these series. 
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Table-1. Descriptive Statistics 
  WKAWPR WKAVGAWCMR WKAVGLIQ 
Sample period 01/01/2004 - 06/27/2013 
Observations 496 495 496 
Mean 13.0933 10.7941 16.3874 
Median 12.1850 9.6540 7.3516 
Maximum 21.1900 31.1650 140.0539 
Minimum 8.8900 7.4343 -21.1787 
Std. Dev. 3.4509 3.2788 26.5432 
              Source:  uthor‟s calculations based on CBSL data 
 
Descriptive statistics indicate that WKAWPR, on average, has been 230 basis points higher than 
WKAVGAWCMR, although the maximum WKAVGAWCMR remained higher at 31.165 per cent in April 2007 
particularly due to the increased demand for funds during the festive week and that too in a short week, while the 
surge in call rates were predominantly due to uncertainties in the financial market of Sri Lanka following the 
triggering of the global economic downturn in 2007. The maximum WKAWPR was recorded at 21.19 per cent in 
late 2008. However, considering the mean and minimum interest rates, it appears that the spread between 
WKAWPR and WKAVGAWCMR is larger when the mean rates are concerned, as opposed to the minimum rates 
presenting higher spreads when market interest rates are high in contrast to an era with low interest rates. The 
standard deviation of WKAWPR is marginally higher than WKAVGAWCMR and denotes relatively low 
volatility in AWCMR possibly due to the weekly averaging of AWCMR, which is computed on a daily basis. 
WKAVGLIQ has been in excess, on average, during this period and peaked to around Rs. 140 billion with the 
receipt of international sovereign bond proceeds in late 2010.  
 
4.2. Testing for Stationarity 
To verify the stationarity of the time series, the variables were subjected to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) unit root test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) to avoid any spurious regressions. The tests were performed using a 
maximum lag length of 4, from which the appropriate lag length was chosen automatically based on the Schwarz 
Information Criteria (SIC). As shown in Table 2, the detrended variables (i.e. HPCYCLEAWPR and 
HPCYCLEAWCMR) were stationary on levels at 1 per cent significance level. WKAVGLIQ was stationary on 
levels at 1 per cent level when the test equation included the constant, but when both the constant and the trend 
components were included in the test equation, WKAVGLIQ was stationary only at the 10 per cent level. 
However, WKAWPR and WKAVGAWCMR were not stationary on levels in both instances where the test 
equation included the constant in one and both the constant and the trend components in the other. Subsequently, 
unit root tests were performed on first differences for WKAWPR and WKAVGAWCMR, resulting in those 
variables being stationary at a very high level of significance. Since the series of HPCYCLEAWPR, 
HPCYCLEAWCMR and WKAVGLIQ was I(0) and the series of WKAWPR and WKAVGAWCMR were I(1), it 
was concluded that testing for co-integration between these variables was not necessary. The series of 
HPCYCLEAWPR would be used as the series representing AWPR, HPCYCLEAWCMR would be used as the 
series representing AWCMR and WKAVGLIQ would be used as the series representing domestic money market 
liquidity. The detrended series of AWPR and AWCMR was used for this analysis as I(1) data (i.e., data that is 
stationary at first differences) leads to excessive volatility while also concealing the dynamics, nature and behaviour 
of the data, whereas such dynamics are preserved to a greater extent, relatively, in the detrended series of data (see 
Figure 4 – 5) reason why it may be more appropriate for this exercise. 
 
 
Figure-4. Average Weighted Call Money Rate (AWCMR) 
                             Source: CBSL 
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Figure-5. Average Weighted Prime Lending Rate (AWPR) 
                            Source: CBSL 
 
Table-2. ADF Unit Root Test Results 
Series 
Level First Difference 
Lags 
Included 
Lags 
Included 
Constant Constant & Trend Constant Constant & Trend 
WKAWPR 1 -1.6826 -1.6276 0 -26.527* -26.5341* 
  
(0.4395) (0.7809) 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
WKAVGAWCMR 4 -2.4239 -2.5241 3 -17.3682* -17.3708* 
  
(0.1357) (0.3163) 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
WKAVGLIQ 0 -3.1984* -3.4112*** 0 -23.3774* -23.3539* 
  
(0.0207) (0.0510) 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
HPCYCLEAWPR 1 -5.7453* -5.7359* 3 -14.6709* -14.6645* 
  
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
HPCYCLEAWCMR 1 -9.1632* -9.1537* 3 -17.5429* -17.5254* 
  
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
Note: MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values are in parentheses below the t-Statistic values   
Test Critical Values: Constant Constant &Trend 
   1% level (*)  
 
-3.4434 -3.9767 
   5% level (**) 
 
-2.8672 -3.4189 
   10% level (***)   -2.5698 -3.1320 
            Source:  uthor‟s calculations based on CBSL data 
 
4.3. Testing for Correlation 
HPCYCLEAWPR, HPCYCLEAWCMR and WKAVGLIQ were used to test for cross-correlations.  
 
Table-3. Correlation Matrix 
Stationary Variables HPCYCLEAWPR HPCYCLEAWCMR WKAVGLIQ 
HPCYCLEAWPR 1.0000   
HPCYCLEAWCMR 0.6431 1.0000 
 WKAVGLIQ -0.2011 -0.1219 1.0000 
                       Source:  uthor‟s calculations based on CBSL data 
 
As per findings following the test for cross-correlations as shown in Table 3, it was observed that the call 
money rate (HPCYCLEAWCMR) has a high degree of positive correlation with the prime lending rate 
(HPCYCLEAWPR). However, liquidity in the domestic money market (WKAVGLIQ) seems to have a relatively 
weak correlation with the prime lending rate as well as the call money market rate, although the nature of 
correlation is negative as it should be in theory. 
Although statistically it appears that liquidity in the domestic money market has a weak correlation with the 
prime lending rate, it is theoretically and practically a fact that domestic money market liquidity is also an 
important determinant of market interest rates. The Hodrick-Prescott Filter (HP Filter) was used to obtain cyclical 
and trend series of domestic money market liquidity and scatter plots were drawn using the cyclical series of data 
on domestic money market liquidity and the prime lending rate (i.e. HPCYCLEAWPR) to identify their 
relationships during monetary policy easing cycles as well as tightening cycles. 
Figure 6 confirms that during policy easing cycles, the relationship between money market liquidity and the 
prime lending rate is overtly weak, although negatively correlated. However, during policy tightening cycles, as 
shown in Figure 7, the relationship between these variables are relatively stronger indicating that money market 
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liquidity is a rather important determinant of the prime lending rate, among other factors, during periods of 
contractionary monetary policy compared to its effect on the prime during loose monetary policy episodes. 
 
 
Figure-6. Relationship between Liquidity and AWPR (in policy tightening cycles) 
                      Source:  uthor‟s calculations based on CBSL data 
 
 
Figure-7. Relationship between Liquidity and AWPR (in policy tightening cycles) 
                      Source:  uthor‟s calculations based on CBSL data 
 
4.4. Granger Causality Test Results 
Next, we test for causality to verify the existence of unidirectional or bidirectional causality among the 
aforementioned variables (i.e., between prime lending rate and the call money market rate, and between prime 
lending rate and domestic money market liquidity). For this, we have performed Granger causality tests (Granger, 
1981) on 3 data samples. First, we have checked for causality by taking the entire sample of data from the period 
01/01/2004 to 06/27/2013, which is shown in Table 4. Secondly, we have determined periods of upward and 
downward trends in the call money rates, and thereafter checked for causality among these variables (Table 5). 
Finally, upward and downward trends of domestic money market liquidity have been identified and these variables 
were then again tested for causality, which is shown in Table 6. The HP Filter was used to draw trend graphs in 
order to identify upward and downward periods of call money market rates and domestic money market liquidity, 
which were subsequently used for the second and third attempts to test for causality. The results are also presented 
for five chosen lag lengths, which are in weeks; 1, 2, 4, 12 and 26 lags.  
Test results of Table 4 indicates that changes to call money market rates leads to changes in the prime lending 
rate in lag lengths 2 through 26. It also indicates that the prime lending rate causes changes in the call money 
market rates at lag lengths 12 and 26, indicating bidirectional causality. Further, increasing bidirectional causality 
could be observed when the lag lengths increase, indicating signs of cointegration between the two variables. 
However, causality between domestic money market liquidity and the prime lending rate is relatively weaker as 
indicated by Table 4.  
As per the causality test findings in Table 5 and Table 6, when different periods of upward and downward 
trends of both call money market rates and domestic money market liquidity are considered, the position on 
causality cannot be commented on and therefore is inconclusive. Data in Table 5 suggests that changes in call 
money rates causes changes in prime lending rates in lag lengths 4 and 12, except in the second upward period 
(02/17/2011-10/18/2012) of call money market rates. The same causality is evident in the first upward and 
downward period in lag length 2, and in the two upward cycles in lag length 1. It also shows that changes in 
domestic money market liquidity causes changes in prime lending rates in both upward periods in lag length 1, 4 
and 26 but no evidence of causality could be seen in the downward periods. In addition, data in Table 6 shows 
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mixed results. However, changes in call money market rates (HPCYCLEAWCMR) and domestic money market 
liquidity (WKAVGLIQ) causes changes in prime lending rates (HPCYCLEAWPR) when the entire sample is 
considered at a lag length of 2. Bidirectional causality exists between the two variables HPCYCLEAWPR and 
HPCYCLEAWCMR when the lag length is 12 and 26, while the null hypothesis of WKAVGLIQ does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR, is rejected at the lag length of 2, implying that domestic money market liquidity causes changes 
in prime lending rates. On the whole, following those results from the causality tests, it can be deduced that both 
the call money market rate as well as domestic money market liquidity are key determinants of the prime lending 
rate in Sri Lanka. 
 
Table-4. Granger Causality Test: Entire Sample (01/01/2004 - 06/27/2013) 
Null Hypothesis 
P value of F-statistic 
1 Lag 2 Lags 4 Lags 12 Lags 26 Lags 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause HPCYCLEAWCMR 0.8505 0.3204 0.2904 0.0533 0.0071 
HPCYCLEAWCMR does not cause HPCYCLEAWPR 0.3737 0.0565 0.0001 1.E-05 4.E-07 
WKAVGLIQ does not cause HPCYCLEAWPR 0.1240 0.0390 0.1800 0.6957 0.8926 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause WKAVGLIQ  0.0478 0.1248 0.3771 0.9096 0.9586 
            Source:  uthor‟s calculations based on CBSL data 
 
Table-5. Granger Causality Test: Changes in AWCMR 
Sample Null Hypothesis 
P value of F-statistic 
1 Lag 2 Lags 4 Lags 12 Lags 26 Lags 
Upward 
period: 
01/01/2004-
12/27/2007 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWCMR 0.4378 0.9422 0.2760 0.0348 0.0381 
HPCYCLEAWCMR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.0771 0.0005 0.0082 0.0004 0.0005 
WKAVGLIQ does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.0743 0.0019 0.0013 0.0033 0.0015 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
WKAVGLIQ  0.0001 0.0015 2.E-05 0.0001 0.0013 
Downward 
period: 
01/03/2008-
02/10/2011 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWCMR 0.1581 0.0428 0.0682 0.2457 0.0558 
HPCYCLEAWCMR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.6591 2.E-05 0.0006 0.0199 3.E-06 
WKAVGLIQ does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.3654 0.3098 0.6869 0.9827 0.9914 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
WKAVGLIQ  0.2002 0.1727 0.2899 0.7669 0.8936 
Upward 
period: 
02/17/2011-
10/18/2012 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWCMR 0.0022 0.0073 0.0250 0.0814 0.7070 
HPCYCLEAWCMR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.0253 0.1636 0.5513 0.4656 0.8730 
WKAVGLIQ does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.0674 0.1638 0.0866 0.3450 0.0495 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
WKAVGLIQ  0.3432 0.1675 0.3674 0.6656 0.0800 
Downward 
period: 
10/25/2012-
06/27/2013 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWCMR 0.3245 0.5533 0.7515 0.8764 NA 
HPCYCLEAWCMR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.2172 0.2060 0.0488 0.0809 NA 
WKAVGLIQ does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.8297 0.6338 0.2922 0.1602 NA 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
WKAVGLIQ  0.7750 0.1549 0.2717 0.3692 NA 
          Source:  uthor‟s calculations based on CBSL data 
 
4.5. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Estimate of the Model and Findings 
To analyse the significance and influence of the call money market rate, domestic money market liquidity and 
lagged  W   in the determination of the current week‟s  W  , a series of ordinary least squares estimates were 
performed.2 Up to 8 lags of all the above variables were tested but as per the regression results, only lags 1 and 4 of 
the prime rate proved to be statistically significant in determining the current week‟s  W  . The model proved to 
be less robust as the number of lags of HPCYCLEAWPR was increased further. Likewise, HPCYCLEAWCMR 
and its first and fourth lags turned out to be statistically significant, although lags 2 and 3 proved otherwise, just as 
in the case of HPCYCLEAWPR. Also, lags of WKAVGLIQ turned out to be statistically insignificant. Further, to 
capture the effects of the prevailing monetary policy stance in the determination of the current week‟s  W  , the 
dummy variable of DUMMYUP, which reflects the period of tight monetary policy in the economy or increase in 
policy interest rates by assuming a value of 1, was used, which was then interacted with HPCYCLEAWCMR. 
Hence, the multiple regression model for the determination of AWPR is as follows: 
H C CLE W  t     + ∑   H C CLE WC  t-i
 
i  +∑   H C CLE W  t-i
 
i    
+   W  VGLI t+   (DU   U *H C CLE WC  t) +  t                (2) 
Ordinary least square (OLS) estimates of the above model (using robust standard errors) are shown in Table 7. 
                                                             
2 Alternate multiple regression models and their OLS estimates are shown in Appendix 1 
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Results of the above regression showed that the average weighted call money rate in the current week (i.e., 
HPCYCLEAWCMRt) along with that of the preceding week, is an important determinant of the current week‟s 
average weighted prime lending rate (HPCYCLEAWPRt). Its combined effect on the current week‟s  W   was 
about 20 per cent. However, domestic money market liquidity, thought to be a key determinant of interest rates, 
proved to be statistically insignificant as per the above model, with its impact on the prime lending rate was 
extremely weak at about 0.06 per cent, although the relationship is negative, as reflected in the estimated 
coefficient. The most remarkable finding was the existence of prime rate persistence, which is measured by the 
lagged prime rate coefficient. 
 
Table-6. Granger Causality Test: Changes in Liquidity 
Sample Null Hypothesis 
P value of F-statistic 
1 Lag 2 Lags 4 Lags 12 Lags 26 Lags 
Upward 
period: 
01/01/2004-
03/24/2005 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWCMR 0.9530 0.2932 0.7703 0.9859 NA 
HPCYCLEAWCMR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.0044 0.0214 0.0092 0.2520 NA 
WKAVGLIQ does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.0017 0.0141 0.0365 0.0257 NA 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
WKAVGLIQ  0.4801 0.4376 0.9879 0.9754 NA 
Downward 
period: 
03/31/2005-
11/23/2006 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWCMR 0.7434 0.9426 0.3139 0.2019 0.0965 
HPCYCLEAWCMR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 4.E-07 2.E-07 1.E-06 2.E-05 0.0010 
WKAVGLIQ does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.5419 0.0301 0.0912 0.6471 0.6307 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
WKAVGLIQ  0.0026 0.0031 0.0280 0.3069 0.0380 
Upward 
period: 
11/30/2006-
05/31/2007 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWCMR 0.9289 0.7750 0.1895 0.1417 NA 
HPCYCLEAWCMR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.4304 0.1221 0.4168 0.4283 NA 
WKAVGLIQ does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.1425 0.0380 0.2522 0.5128 NA 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
WKAVGLIQ  0.0163 0.0849 0.0167 0.5952 NA 
Downward 
period: 
06/07/2007-
10/02/2008 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWCMR 0.6474 0.3973 0.8978 0.2976 0.4019 
HPCYCLEAWCMR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.0384 0.2846 0.5292 0.2385 0.2840 
WKAVGLIQ does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.0006 0.0055 0.0387 0.1012 0.4775 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
WKAVGLIQ  0.1116 0.3142 0.2437 0.2241 0.4350 
Upward 
period: 
10/09/2008-
01/27/2011 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWCMR 0.1804 0.0601 0.2115 0.1676 0.0008 
HPCYCLEAWCMR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.7250 0.0166 0.0656 0.0531 0.0013 
WKAVGLIQ does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.6306 0.5501 0.8408 0.7978 0.7102 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
WKAVGLIQ  0.6654 0.7595 0.8545 0.8434 0.8027 
Downward 
period: 
02/03/2011-
11/22/2012 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWCMR 0.0026 0.0081 0.0292 0.0990 0.6027 
HPCYCLEAWCMR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.0146 0.1368 0.5180 0.4883 0.8332 
WKAVGLIQ does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.0820 0.2533 0.1934 0.5073 0.1732 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
WKAVGLIQ  0.3836 0.1586 0.3059 0.6698 0.2789 
Upward 
period: 
11/29/2012-
06/27/2013 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWCMR 0.1369 0.2922 0.4373 0.6860 NA 
HPCYCLEAWCMR does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.4121 0.3594 0.0963 0.1301 NA 
WKAVGLIQ does not cause 
HPCYCLEAWPR 0.8920 0.6923 0.3618 0.3465 NA 
HPCYCLEAWPR does not cause 
WKAVGLIQ  0.9723 0.2848 0.4326 0.6714 NA 
           Source:  uthor‟s calculations based on CBSL data 
 
 rime rate persistence could be observed with the preceding week‟s  W   accounting for 6 .5 per cent of the 
current week‟s  W  ; statistically significant at the   per cent level. This phenomenon, as highlighted by market 
participants, especially by those prime borrowers, implies the presence of prime rate persistence, where commercial 
banks consider the preceding week‟s prime lending rate as a benchmark when setting prime lending rate for the 
current week. Also, such a high degree of persistence, along with other factors, could result in rigidity of the prime 
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lending rate, especially downwards, thereby leading to asymmetric adjustments following changes in monetary 
policy. 
R-squared and the adjusted R-squared recorded around 0.85, while the probability value of the F-statistic 
indicates that all variables in the regression jointly can influence the dependent variable, which is the prime lending 
rate. The above model was estimated using robust standard errors (Heteroscedasticity Consistent Covariances) by 
White (1980) to obtain consistent estimates of coefficient covariances as the residuals appeared to be 
heteroscedastic.  Further, the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test (Godfrey, 1978); (Breusch, 1978) was 
conducted to test for serial correlation, which resulted in the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in residuals not 
being rejected. This result was confirmed by the Durbin-Watson statistic reported above, which is 2.03 per cent 
(Durbin and Watson, 1951). 
 
Table-7. OLS Estimates of HPCYCLEAWPR (using Robust Standard Errors) 
Independent Variables Coefficient P-value 
Constant 0.0046 0.8035 
 
(0.0183) 
 HPCYCLEAWCMRt 0.2721 0.0000 
 
(0.0527) 
 HPCYCLEAWCMRt-1 -0.0739 0.0435 
 
(0.0366) 
 HPCYCLEAWCMRt-2 -0.0208 0.5483 
 
(0.0346) 
 HPCYCLEAWCMRt-3 0.0125 0.7277 
 
(0.0358) 
 HPCYCLEAWCMRt-4 -0.0841 0.0017 
 
(0.0266) 
 HPCYCLEAWPRt-1 0.6355 0.0000 
 
(0.0803) 
 HPCYCLEAWPRt-2 0.0720 0.3806 
 
(0.0821) 
 HPCYCLEAWPRt-3 -0.0117 0.8716 
 
(0.0727) 
 HPCYCLEAWPRt-4 0.1882 0.0007 
 
(0.0550) 
 WKAVGLIQt -0.0006 0.1981 
 
(0.0005) 
 (DUMMYUP*HPCYCLEAWCMR)t 0.0020 0.9682 
 
(0.0505) 
 No. of Observations (after adjustments) 491 
 
R-squared 0.8568 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.8535 
 Log likelihood -164.1038 
 Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.0341 
 F-Statistic 260.5427 0.0000 
                    Note: Standard errors are in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. 
Source:  uthor‟s calculations based on CBSL data 
 
4.6. Vector Autoregression (VAR) Model Findings 
Next, in order to identify how the present level of each variable in the model depends on past movements in 
that particular variable as well as in all other variables of the model and to test how a one-time shock to the 
independent variables in this study could bring about a change in the prime lending rate (i.e. AWPR), an 
unrestricted vector autoregressive (VAR) model is formed and expressed in the following form: 
HPCYCLEAWCMRt =  0 +  1 HPCYCLEAWCMRt-p +  2 WKAVGLIQt-p +  
 3 HPCYCLEAWPRt-p +  4 DUMMYUP1t + ɛ1t         (3) 
HPCYCLEAWPRt     = β0 + β1 HPCYCLEAWCMRt-p + β2 WKAVGLIQt-p +  
β3 HPCYCLEAWPRt-p + β4 DUMMYUP2t + ɛ2t         (4) 
WKAVGLIQt            = γ0 + γ 1 HPCYCLEAWCMRt-p + γ 2 WKAVGLIQt-p +  
γ 3 HPCYCLEAWPRt-p + γ 4 DUMMYUP3t + ɛ3t         (5) 
where,  
p = number of lags included in the model 
ɛt  = vector of residuals 
Prior to estimating the above VAR model, it is important to test the appropriate lag length. For this purpose, a 
test to determine the lag length criteria was performed. As suggested by VAR lag order selection criteria, the VAR 
model was then estimated using six lags (see Table 8). The six lag structure was suggested as the optimal for the 
model by the „Sequential modified L  test statistic‟ (each test at 5 per cent level), Final prediction error (F E) and 
Akaike information criterion (AIC). The Schwarz information criterion (SC) and the Hannan-Quinn information 
criterion (HQ), however, suggested that the optimal lag structure would be one and two, respectively.  
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Table-8. VAR Lag Length Criteria 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: HPCYCLEAWCMR HPCYCLEAWPR WKAVGLIQ  
Exogenous variables: C DUMMYUP    
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -3657.947 NA   646.6709  14.98547  15.03691  15.00567 
1 -2699.731  1896.838  13.32395  11.10319   11.23179*  11.15370 
2 -2681.282  36.29339  12.81897  11.06455  11.27031   11.14536* 
3 -2674.972  12.33559  12.96098  11.07555  11.35847  11.18667 
4 -2656.298  36.27916  12.45846  11.03598  11.39606  11.17741 
5 -2647.083  17.78964  12.44796  11.03510  11.47234  11.20684 
6 -2637.341   18.68688*   12.41090*   11.03207*  11.54647  11.23411 
       * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
FPE: Final prediction error  
AIC: Akaike information criterion  
SC: Schwarz information criterion  
                    HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
 
VAR Lag Exclusion Wald Tests were performed to test for the joint significance of all endogenous variables 
and it was observed that the p-value for lag 3 was insignificant (Table 9). Considering the above, the VAR model 
was re-estimated with lags of one to two and four to six. (see Appendix 2) 
 
Table-9. VAR Lag Exclusion Wald Tests 
VAR Lag Exclusion Wald Tests   
Chi-squared test statistics for lag exclusion:  
Numbers in [ ] are p-values   
 WKAVGLIQ HPCYCLEAWPR HPCYCLEAWCMR Joint 
Lag 1  390.1815  251.5190  104.5307  760.6224 
 [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] 
     
Lag 2  0.395948  11.47597  17.14491  23.37176 
 [ 0.941078] [ 0.009412] [ 0.000660] [ 0.005413] 
     
Lag 3  0.201685  1.980146  9.352212  11.60456 
 [ 0.977317] [ 0.576538] [ 0.024957] [ 0.236531] 
     
Lag 4  6.267360  5.865745  2.178221  29.41485 
 [ 0.099303] [ 0.118328] [ 0.536251] [ 0.000551] 
     
Lag 5  2.611404  7.555177  12.46814  25.57248 
 [ 0.455494] [ 0.056158] [ 0.005940] [ 0.002399] 
     
Lag 6  1.795580  16.08006  10.61492  18.97502 
 [ 0.615897] [ 0.001092] [ 0.014001] [ 0.025406] 
df 3 3 3 9 
             Source:  uthor‟s calculations based on CBSL data 
 
Next, it is imperative to ensure the stationarity of the series. For this purpose, the inverse roots of the 
autoregressive characteristic polynomial was examined and as per Figure 8, the VAR model is stationary (stable) 
since all roots lie inside the unit circle. 
 
 
Figure-8. Stationarity of the VAR Model 
 
The impulse response of the prime lending rate to unanticipated increases in call money market rates 
(AWCMR) and domestic money market liquidity, based on VAR estimates, were obtained for a period of 26 weeks 
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and these responses included „analytic (asymptotic) standard errors‟. The impulse responses of  W   to shocks on 
AWCMR, domestic money market liquidity and AWPR is shown in Figure 9.  
As per the first graph in Figure 9 it is visible that a positive shock to the call money market rate has a positive 
impact on AWPR after the first lag, peaks at lag four, shows a slight negative effect and subsequently stabilises 
thereafter.  
 
 
Figure-9. Impulse response of AWPR to shocks on AWCMR, Domestic Money Market Liquidity and AWPR 
                     Source:  uthor‟s calculations based on CBSL data 
 
AWPR declines somewhat immediately following a positive shock to domestic money market liquidity, peaks 
at lag two, and the effect dies down after about fifteen lags. The third graph shows the response of AWPR to an 
unexpected increase in the AWPR itself. The effect of the shock is significant and felt immediately, but stabilises 
only after about twenty lags, indicating that AWPR, itself, is one of its key determinants. 
The variance decomposition over 26 weeks is presented in Figure 10. The variance decomposition offers 
information about the relative importance of each random innovation in affecting the dependent variable of AWPR 
in the estimated VAR model. As per the findings, about 4 per cent of the variance in AWPR is due to domestic 
money market liquidity, while AWPR itself accounts for about 92 per cent of the variance. However, the variance 
in AWPR due to AWCMR is relatively insignificant (about 2 per cent). 
 
 
Figure-10. Variance Decomposition 
                                                                        Source:  uthor‟s calculations based on CBSL data 
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4.7. Presence of Asymmetries Tested Using Observations from Raw Data and Impulse Response 
Functions (IRFs) 
Another important purpose of this study was to test for the presence of asymmetries in the adjustment of prime 
lending rates following changes in the monetary policy stance in Sri Lanka. A new data series on the Reverse 
Repurchase (Reverse Repo) rate3 was used to aid this examination. It is denoted as REVREPO in this study.  
Using the above data series on the Reverse Repurchase rate, along with the call money market rate and the 
prime lending rate, a basic analysis was done using raw data, while an attempt was made to test for the same using 
a VAR model and Impulse Response Functions (IRFs). 
 
4.7.1. Observations from Raw Data 
To identify the presence of asymmetric adjustment in the prime lending rate, the series of WKAWPR, 
WKAVGAWCMR and REVREPO was used. Based on the changes in the monetary policy stance in Sri Lanka, the 
sample period was segmented to policy cycles and assigned names to assist the study (Refer Table 10).  
 
Table-10. Segmented Policy Cycles 
Period Type Period Name 
01/01/2004 - 11/11/2004 Easy Easy 1 
11/18/2004 - 02/05/2009 Tight Tight 1 
02/12/2009 - 02/02/2012 Easy Easy 2 
02/09/2012 - 12/06/2012 Tight Tight 2 
12/13/2012 - 06/27/2013 Easy Easy 3 
                                               Source:  uthor‟s calculations based on CBSL data 
 
Next, the movements of all the above variables were tracked, findings of which are shown in Table 11. 
 
Table-11. Changes in Interest Rates during Monetary Policy Cycles 
in bps  
Period Reverse Repurchase Rate AWCMR AWPR AWPR=(AWCMR) x 
Easy 1 
 
+135 +53 0.4 
Tight 1 +350 +543 +1052 1.9 
Easy 2 -350 -540 -856 1.6 
Tight 2 +125 +163 +276 1.7 
Easy 3 -75 -195 -221 1.1 
                 Source:  uthor‟s calculations based on CBSL data 
 
Based on the outcome of the above exercise, a clear assessment on the results of the first cycle (i.e., Easy 1) 
cannot be done as the sample period in this study commences from January 2004 and there has been no change in 
the Reverse Repurchase rate since 01 January 2004 up until mid-November 2004, where steps were taken to 
tighten monetary policy, which is the starting point of the „Tight  ‟ cycle. However, it can be noted that despite the 
first cycle being an „Easy‟ cycle, both  WC   and  W   has risen quite significantly. With mounting inflation 
and monetary growth in 2004, the CBSL aggressively conducted open market operations (OMO), as a first step, to 
absorb the excess liquidity in the domestic money market, which induced an upward adjustment in the short-term 
market interest rates; hence the increase in both AWCMR and AWPR. 
Subsequently, monetary policy was tightened further by way of increasing the policy interest rates in 
 ovember     , and during the period of „Tight  ‟, the  everse  epurchase rate was increased gradually by 350 
basis points up until the next easing cycle. During this period, AWCMR rose by 543 basis points, while AWPR 
rose by 1,052 basis points. 
During the third cycle, „Easy  ‟, the  everse  epurchase rate was brought down by  5  basis points. Despite 
AWCMR declining by 540 basis points during this period, AWPR declined by only around 850 basis points, 
indicating the relative downward rigidity in the prime lending rate (when compared with „Tight  ‟, where the 
change in the Reverse Repurchase rate is the same); an example of asymmetric adjustment. 
In the following period (Tight 2), which is the shortest tightening cycle ever in Sri Lankan history, the Reverse 
Repurchase rate was raised by 125 basis points, whereas AWCMR and AWPR increased by 163 basis points and 
276 basis points, respectively. 
In the last monetary policy cycle, „Easy  ‟,  WC   and  W   have reduced by  95 basis points and     
basis points, respectively, in response to the reduction in the Reverse Repurchase rate (by 75 basis points).  
The final column of Table 11 indicates that during the easing cycles of monetary policy, the multiple of 
AWCMR is relatively lesser that during tightening cycles, signifying that the magnitude-wise adjustment by 
commercial banks during an interest rate rising setting is relatively higher than the interest rate relaxing setting. 
This indicates the presence of asymmetric adjustment of the prime lending rate to varying policy cycles.  
 
4.7.2. Findings from VAR and IRFs 
In this exercise to test for asymmetric adjustment in the prime lending rate, a VAR estimate was conducted for 
the different monetary policy cycle periods. However, the first and the last monetary policy cycles were not 
considered for this exercise as those were not full-cycle periods, as constrained by the chosen sample for this study.  
The chosen lag length was 1 based on VAR lag order selection criteria and following the VAR estimation, impulse response 
functions for those three cycles („Tight  ‟, „Easy  ‟ and „Tight  ‟) were generated as shown in Figure 11. 
                                                             
3 This is a key policy rate that forms the upper bound of the interest rate corridor for the call money market rate. It is the rate charged by the CBSL on 
overnight borrowing by commercial banks. In other words, it is the overnight lending rate of the CBSL. However, with effect from 2 January 2014, the 
Reverse Repurchase rate was renamed and is now known as the Standing Lending Facility Rate (SLFR). 
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Figure-11. Impulse Responses of AWCMR and AWPR to shocks on the Reverse Repurchase Rate 
Source:  uthor‟s calculations based on CBSL data 
 
As per the above figure, during tightening policy cycles, the response of both HPCYLCEAWCMR and 
HPCYCLEAWPR to one-time shocks on the Reverse Repurchase Rate appears to be quite similar. However, in the 
easing policy cycle, HPCYCLEAWPR seems to rise till about lag 5 before adjusting down and moving towards the 
trend path, while HPCYCLEAWCMR declines almost immediately. This asymmetric adjustment could be 
attributed to the existence of persistence in the prime lending rate of Sri Lanka. However, it should be noted that 
this particular exercise was done with the limited available information and could prove spurious if a larger data 
sample was considered. 
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This paper analyses the behaviour of the prime lending rate in Sri Lanka during the period January 2004 – 
June 2013. The main objective of this paper is to identify the determinants of the prime lending rate in Sri Lanka, 
with special focus to prime rate persistence and asymmetries.  
This study was inspired by the growing interest on the attributes and importance of the prime lending rate 
among those in the private sector, commercial banks as well as the Central Bank. It was often argued that the 
prime lending rate, i.e., AWPR, outshined as the key benchmark lending rate, as opposed to the Sri Lanka 
Interbank Offered Rate (SLIBOR) earlier. The downward rigidness of AWPR during periods of easing monetary 
policy was often critiqued. This study reveals that in addition to the call money market rate being a key 
determinant of the prime lending rate in Sri Lanka, prime rate persistence, is also a major factor in the 
determination of the current week‟s  W  .  esults from this study confirmed this phenomenon.  lthough it could 
be considered acceptable for commercial banks to charge relatively higher rates of interest on prime lending during 
business troughs as a means of charging a premia on potential risk of default as observed by Dueker and Thornton 
(1994) and Dueker (2000) holding up the rates high with the motive of making and maximising short-term profits 
seem unacceptable as it could deter credit obtained by the private sector, thereby also affecting the long-term 
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growth of the country. Also, increased prime rate persistence is likely to be a partial causal factor for the 
asymmetric adjustment in the prime lending rate to changes in the monetary policy stance in the nation. 
Persistence in the prime lending rate, especially during policy easing cycles where market lending rates would 
be slow in adjusting downwards, will continue to be a phenomenon as long as it does not lead to loss of 
competitiveness of the respective banks. However, data reflects that the adjustment takes place gradually, although 
may not be fully.  
The higher borrowing requirement of the government, especially witnessed towards the end of the sample 
period, could also be a reason for market lending rates, including the prime lending rate to not adjust downwards 
fully. A faster adjustment could have been possible had the government reliance on bank borrowings being less 
over the years, thereby facilitating a quicker and fuller pass through of monetary policy actions taken by the 
Central Bank. 
Although OLS estimates state that domestic money market liquidity is an extremely weak and statistically 
insignificant determinant of the prime lending rate, it can be observed that since the global financial crisis, the 
spreads between AWPR and AWCMR have increased when overnight liquidity was at a balanced position. 
However, when overnight liquidity was high and in excess, market lending rates and their spreads narrowed. This 
suggests that it would be ideal if the economy could maintain an excess of about Rs. 15 – 25 billion in the overnight 
domestic money market, which would not only aid the economy and its stakeholders to enjoy low rates of interest, 
but would also help increase the affordability of credit, thereby increasing demand for credit by the private sector, 
which would subsequently lead to long term economic growth. 
Alternatively, several measures could be taken to improve the computation of AWPR as the weekly computed 
rates are largely susceptible to transactions of large borrowers (where the prime rate could be relatively more 
volatile in their absence during a particular business week). Moreover, as highlighted in Section 1.2.2., only 
transactions exceeding Rs. 10 million are considered for the computation of AWPR. This could cause prime 
lending of relatively smaller amounts (Eg: Rs. 9 million) by small banks to be excluded from the computation of 
AWPR. This issue could also be addressed when a new computation methodology is designed. 
Finally, this study could be extended to cover a larger sample period, while including any other explanatory 
variables. Also, basic econometric techniques were used when testing for asymmetries in this study. This could be 
further extended by using more advanced techniques such as ARCH/ GARCH, Ordered Probit or TAR/MTAR, 
which would be useful in observing asymmetric adjustments in the prime lending rate during various monetary 
policy cycles. 
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Appendix-1 – Alternate Multiple Regression Models and their OLS Estimates 
i. Model I: 
                                 ∑                 
 
                
                                (6) 
 
               OLS Estimates of Model I 
Dependent Variable: HPCYCLEAWPR  
Method: Least Squares   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.033492 0.032740 1.022962 0.3068 
HPCYCLEAWCMR 0.235121 0.011367 20.68438 0.0000 
HPCYCLEAWPR(-1) 0.533687 0.034191 15.60906 0.0000 
HPCYCLEAWPR(-2) 0.083408 0.040524 2.058252 0.0401 
HPCYCLEAWPR(-3) 0.098982 0.033270 2.975079 0.0031 
WKAVGLIQ -0.001389 0.000721 -1.925165 0.0548 
DUMMYUP -0.027959 0.038463 -0.726916 0.4676 
R-squared 0.827491 Mean dependent var -0.001067 
Adjusted R-squared 0.825361 S.D. dependent var 0.892322 
S.E. of regression 0.372899 Akaike info criterion 0.879080 
Sum squared resid 67.58018 Schwarz criterion 0.938722 
Log likelihood -209.6933 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.902498 
F-statistic 388.5411 Durbin-Watson stat 1.672131 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
Model II: 
                                 ∑                 
 
                
   (                     )                                    (7) 
             OLS Estimates of Model II 
Dependent Variable: HPCYCLEAWPR  
Method: Least Squares   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.004430 0.035255 -0.125668 0.9000 
HPCYCLEAWCMR 0.111015 0.046001 2.413308 0.0162 
HPCYCLEAWPR(-1) 0.533037 0.033957 15.69750 0.0000 
HPCYCLEAWPR(-2) 0.082120 0.040248 2.040346 0.0419 
HPCYCLEAWPR(-3) 0.095907 0.033060 2.900967 0.0039 
WKAVGLIQ -0.001167 0.000721 -1.619088 0.1061 
DUMMYUP*HPCYCLEAWCMR 0.131905 0.047396 2.783016 0.0056 
DUMMYUP 0.007834 0.040305 0.194364 0.8460 
R-squared 0.830203 Mean dependent var -0.001067 
Adjusted R-squared 0.827752 S.D. dependent var 0.892322 
S.E. of regression 0.370338 Akaike info criterion 0.867294 
Sum squared resid 66.51792 Schwarz criterion 0.935456 
Log likelihood -205.7879 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.894057 
F-statistic 338.7639 Durbin-Watson stat 1.675623 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  
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          Appendix-2. VAR Estimates 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates  
    
 HPCYCLEAWCMR HPCYCLEAWPR WKAVGLIQ 
HPCYCLEAWCMR(-1)  0.487731  0.065730  0.493830 
  (0.06781)  (0.02524)  (0.37976) 
 [ 7.19311] [ 2.60439] [ 1.30037] 
HPCYCLEAWCMR(-2)  0.126578  0.010851  0.135373 
  (0.06650)  (0.02475)  (0.37243) 
 [ 1.90352] [ 0.43840] [ 0.36348] 
HPCYCLEAWCMR(-4) -0.024470 -0.074717  0.645027 
  (0.06921)  (0.02576)  (0.38763) 
 [-0.35356] [-2.90037] [ 1.66402] 
HPCYCLEAWCMR(-5)  0.026294 -0.044850 -0.209016 
  (0.07205)  (0.02682)  (0.40356) 
 [ 0.36492] [-1.67226] [-0.51793] 
HPCYCLEAWCMR(-6)  0.034461  0.027217 -0.331251 
  (0.06329)  (0.02356)  (0.35448) 
 [ 0.54448] [ 1.15533] [-0.93447] 
HPCYCLEAWPR(-1) -0.211750  0.558659 -0.045427 
  (0.17963)  (0.06686)  (1.00609) 
 [-1.17878] [ 8.35531] [-0.04515] 
HPCYCLEAWPR(-2)  0.189880  0.154478 -0.186369 
  (0.18423)  (0.06857)  (1.03183) 
 [ 1.03067] [ 2.25273] [-0.18062] 
HPCYCLEAWPR(-4) -0.054738  0.173032 -0.962634 
  (0.18548)  (0.06904)  (1.03884) 
 [-0.29511] [ 2.50628] [-0.92664] 
HPCYCLEAWPR(-5)  0.428498  0.213369  0.757157 
  (0.21076)  (0.07845)  (1.18040) 
 [ 2.03314] [ 2.71991] [ 0.64144] 
HPCYCLEAWPR(-6) -0.472971 -0.233352  0.679687 
  (0.16793)  (0.06251)  (0.94055) 
 [-2.81645] [-3.73321] [ 0.72265] 
WKAVGLIQ(-1) -0.009814 -0.005451  0.922914 
  (0.00836)  (0.00311)  (0.04682) 
 [-1.17403] [-1.75189] [ 19.7133] 
WKAVGLIQ(-2)  0.010653  0.005436 -0.040283 
  (0.00977)  (0.00364)  (0.05471) 
 [ 1.09056] [ 1.49522] [-0.73632] 
WKAVGLIQ(-4) -0.003124  0.001258  0.126524 
  (0.00972)  (0.00362)  (0.05441) 
 [-0.32159] [ 0.34778] [ 2.32526] 
WKAVGLIQ(-5)  0.002703 -0.001757 -0.094245 
  (0.01134)  (0.00422)  (0.06350) 
 [ 0.23837] [-0.41629] [-1.48419] 
WKAVGLIQ(-6) -0.000291  0.000183  0.039502 
  (0.00842)  (0.00313)  (0.04716) 
 [-0.03452] [ 0.05833] [ 0.83758] 
C -0.111864 -0.037765  1.725674 
  (0.12208)  (0.04544)  (0.68372) 
 [-0.91635] [-0.83112] [ 2.52396] 
DUMMYUP  0.202319  0.070872 -1.800806 
  (0.14094)  (0.05246)  (0.78938) 
 [ 1.43549] [ 1.35096] [-2.28130] 
 R-squared  0.329725  0.702169  0.924201 
 Adj. R-squared  0.307003  0.692073  0.921632 
 Sum sq. resids  842.0625  116.6635  26414.41 
 S.E. equation  1.335676  0.497160  7.480824 
 F-statistic  14.51176  69.54945  359.6895 
 Log likelihood -826.7447 -343.4757 -1669.245 
 Akaike AIC  3.450899  1.474338  6.896709 
 Schwarz SC  3.596645  1.620085  7.042456 
 Mean dependent -0.000245 -0.001410  16.47175 
 S.D. dependent  1.604485  0.895927  26.72268 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  11.06347 
 Determinant resid covariance   9.949260 
 Log likelihood  -2643.321 
 Akaike information criterion   11.01972 
 Schwarz criterion   11.45696 
              Note:  Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
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